corrupt
civilization of the East with the barbaric energy of the West. The
Mediterranean became a Roman lake,--_mare nostrum_, they said,--and
the same life circulated on all its shores, called for the first and
the last time to a common existence.
In this work were employed a century and a half of struggles and
diplomacy; for Rome, working for a patient aristocracy and not for a
man, was not compelled to attain her end at a bound. Instead of
rearing suddenly one of those colossal monarchies formed like the
statue of gold with feet of clay, she founded slowly an empire which
fell only under the weight of years and of the Northern hordes. After
Zama she could have attempted the conquest of Africa, but she left
Carthage and the Numidians to enfeeble each other. After Cynoscephalae
and Magnesia, Greece and Asia were all ready for the yoke, but she
accorded them fifty years more of liberty. This was because, along
with the pride of the Roman name and the necessity for dominion, she
always retained some of her ancient virtues. The Popiliuses were more
numerous than the Verreses. Now she preferred to rule the world; later
she will put it to pillage. Thus, wherever Rome saw strength she sent
her legions; all power was broken; the ties of States and leagues were
shattered; and when her soldiers were recalled they left behind them
only weakness and anarchy. But the task of the legions accomplished,
that of the Senate began. After force came craft and diplomacy. Those
senators, grown old amidst the terrors of the second Punic war, seemed
now to have less pleasure in arms than in the game of politics,--the
first, in all ages, of Italian arts.
Several other causes dictated this policy of reserve. Against the
Gauls, the Samnites, Pyrrhus, and Hannibal,--in other words, for the
defense of Latium and of Italy,--Rome had employed all her strength;
it was then a question of her existence: whereas, in the wars with
Greece and with Asia, her ambition and her pride alone were
interested; and wisdom demanded that some relaxation be given to the
plebeians and the allies. The Senate had moreover too many affairs on
its hands--the wars with Spain, with Corsica, with Cisalpina, and with
Istria--to admit of its becoming deeply involved in the East.
Therefore two legions only will fight Philip and Antiochus--that will
suffice to conquer, but would be too little to despoil them.
Furthermore, the Senate believed that in penetrating into this G
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