of his own character and his own actions. But when, on
the other hand, it is necessary for evolutionary morality to justify
actions which, although intrinsically unjust, are necessary for the
prosperity of the species, it falls back upon what it reluctantly terms
Nature's indifference or injustice. Here we have two unknown aims,
that of humanity and that of Nature; and these, wrapped as they are in
a mystery that may some day perhaps pass away, would seem to be
irreconcilable in our mind. Essentially, all these questions resolve
themselves into one, which is of the utmost importance to our
contemporary morality. The race would appear to be becoming conscious,
prematurely it may be, and perhaps disastrously, not, we will say, of
its rights, for that problem is still in suspense, but of the fact that
morality does not enter into certain actions that go to make history.

This disquieting consciousness would seem to be slowly invading our
individual life. Thrice, and more or less in the course of one year,
has this question confronted us, and assumed vast proportions: in the
matter of America's crushing defeat of Spain (although here the issues
were confused, for the Spaniards, besides their present blunders, had
been guilty of so many acts of injustice in the past, that the problem
becomes very involved); in the case of an innocent man sacrificed to
the preponderating interests of his country; and in the iniquitous war
of the Transvaal. It is true that the phenomenon is not altogether
without precedent. Man has always endeavoured to justify his
injustice; and when human justice offered him no excuse or pretext, he
found in the will of the gods a law superior to the justice of man.
But our excuse or pretext of to-day is fraught with the more peril to
our morality inasmuch as it reposes on a law, or at least a habit, of
Nature, that is far more real, more incontestable and universal than
the will of an ephemeral and local god.

Which shall prevail in the end, justice or force? Does force contain
an unknown justice that will absorb our human justice, or is the
impulse of justice within us, that would seem to resist blind force,
actually no more than a devious emanation from that force, tending to
the same end; and is it only the point of deviation that escapes us?
This is not a question that we can answer, we who ourselves form part
of the mystery we seek to solve; the reply could come only from one who
might be gazi