ngs, but substance (as was shown above, n. 40-43), so in
like manner are all things that are called civil, moral, and spiritual.
These may be thought of abstractly from substances, yet in themselves
they are not abstract; as for example, affection and thought, charity
and faith, will and understanding; for it is the same with these as
with love and wisdom, in that they are not possible outside of subjects
which are substances, but are states of subjects, that is, substances.
That they are changes of these, presenting variations, will be seen in
what follows. By substance is also meant form, for substance is not
possible apart from form.

210. From its being possible to think of will and understanding, of
affection and thought, and of charity and faith, abstractly from the
substances which are their subjects, and from their having been so
thought of, it has come to pass, that a correct idea of these things,
as being states of substances or forms, has perished. It is altogether
as with sensations and actions, which are not things abstract from the
organs of sensation and motion. Abstracted, that is, separate, from these
they are mere figments of reason; for they are like sight apart from an
eye, hearing apart from an ear, taste apart from a tongue, and so forth.

211. Since all things civil, moral, and spiritual advance through
degrees, just as natural things do, not only through continuous but
also through discrete degrees; and since the progressions of discrete
degrees are like progressions of ends to causes, and of causes to
effects, I have chosen to illustrate and confirm the present point,
that the outmost degree is the complex, containant, and base of prior
degrees, by the things above mentioned, that is, by what pertains to
love and wisdom, to will and understanding, to affection and thought,
and to charity and faith.

212. That the outmost degree is the complex, containant, and base of
prior degrees, is clearly seen from progression of ends and causes to
effects. That the effect is the complex, containant, and base of causes
and ends can be comprehended by enlightened reason; but it is not so
clear that the end with all things thereof, and the cause with all things
thereof, are actually in the effect, and that the effect is their full
complex. That such is the case can be seen from what has been said above
in this Part, particularly from this, that one thing is from another in
a threefold series, and that the ef