except
strategy. Certain rules can be laid down governing strategy, but they do
not always work. Generally speaking, it is psychology; something which
exists in the other man's mind. To read the other man's mind or make a
good guess at it, defeats the most scientifically conceived strategy.
Napoleon outwitted the best military brains and was himself the greatest
strategist of his time, because he invariably departed from fixed
military customs and kept his opponent entirely at sea regarding what he
was doing or intended to do. Very seldom did he do the thing which his
enemy thought he would do; which seemed most likely and proper according
to military science. He thought and acted quickly in crises, relied
constantly on the element of surprise and invented new strategy on the
spur of the moment.

It was the big new strategy, the big new surprises, with which the
Germans found themselves unable to cope. The strategy of Foch which
developed in the offensive shortly after the battle of Chateau Thierry
in July and was well under way in the early part of August, was a
surprise to the Germans. Pershing surprised them in his St. Mihiel and
following operations, especially the battles of Argonne Forest, and had
a greater surprise in store for them in the Lorraine campaign had the
war continued.

Perhaps the Germans figured at Metz, that owing to the extreme
difficulty of the ground to be covered, their strong fortifications and
great gun power, any advance, especially of Negro troops, would be slow.
They accordingly timed their artillery action and their defensive
measures for a slow assault.

But they were surprised again. Officers could not hold back the Negro
fighters and German guns and soldiers could not stop them. They plunged
on to Preny and Pagny, and they rushed into the Bois Frehaut, and held
for thirty-six hours, this place from which picked Moroccan and
Senegalese troops were forced to retreat in ten minutes after they had
entered it. The Bois Frehaut was an inferno under the murderous fire of
the Germans. Holding it for thirty-six hours and remaining there until
hostilities ceased, it is surprising that the casualty list of the 92nd
Division did not amount to many times 1,511.

It is not intended to convey the impression that the Negroes were
entirely responsible for the victory before Metz. Many thousands of
white troops participated and fought just as valiantly. But this History
concerns itself with the ope