peoples of the
Central Empires possessed a greater power of resistance to the
temptations of lawlessness and disorder than was presumed in the winter
of 1918-19. And yet it was a critical time. Anything might have
happened. It would have taken very little to turn the scale. What
occurred later cannot excuse the delay in making peace. It was not wise
statesmanship and foresight that saved the world from a great
catastrophe but the fortunate circumstance that a people habituated to
obedience were not led astray by the enemies of the existing order.
Of the importance of negotiating a peace without waiting to complete a
detailed plan for a League of Nations I was firmly convinced in those
early days at Paris, and I know that the President's judgment as to this
was contrary to mine. He considered--at least his course can only be so
interpreted--that the organization of a League in all its details was
the principal task to be accomplished by the Conference, a task that he
felt must be completed before other matters were settled. The conclusion
is that the necessity of an immediate peace seemed to him subordinate to
the necessity of erecting an international agency to preserve the peace
when it was restored. In fact one may infer that the President was
disposed to employ the general longing for peace as a means of exerting
pressure on the delegates in Paris and on their Governments to accept
his plan for a League. It is generally believed that objections to
certain provisions of the Covenant were not advanced or, if advanced,
were not urged because the discussion of objections would mean delay in
negotiating the peace.
Mr. Wilson gave most of his time and thought prior to his departure for
the United States in February, 1919, to the revision of the plan of
organization which he had prepared and to the conversion of the more
influential members of the Conference to its support. While other
questions vital to a preliminary peace treaty were brought up in the
Council of Ten, he showed a disposition to keep them open and to avoid
their settlement until the Covenant had been reported to the Conference.
In this I could not conscientiously follow him. I felt that the policy
was wholly wrong since it delayed the peace.
Though recognizing the President's views as to the relative importance
of organizing a League and of restoring peace without delay, and
suspecting that he purposed to use the impatience and fear of the
delegates t
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