his transport took the road to Znaim.

Marching thirty miles that stormy night across roadless hills, with his
hungry, ill-shod soldiers, and losing a third of his men as stragglers
by the way, Bagration came out on the Vienna-Znaim road at Hollabrunn
a few hours ahead of the French who were approaching Hollabrunn from
Vienna. Kutuzov with his transport had still to march for some days
before he could reach Znaim. Hence Bagration with his four thousand
hungry, exhausted men would have to detain for days the whole enemy army
that came upon him at Hollabrunn, which was clearly impossible. But a
freak of fate made the impossible possible. The success of the trick
that had placed the Vienna bridge in the hands of the French without
a fight led Murat to try to deceive Kutuzov in a similar way. Meeting
Bagration's weak detachment on the Znaim road he supposed it to be
Kutuzov's whole army. To be able to crush it absolutely he awaited the
arrival of the rest of the troops who were on their way from Vienna,
and with this object offered a three days' truce on condition that both
armies should remain in position without moving. Murat declared that
negotiations for peace were already proceeding, and that he therefore
offered this truce to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Count Nostitz, the
Austrian general occupying the advanced posts, believed Murat's emissary
and retired, leaving Bagration's division exposed. Another emissary rode
to the Russian line to announce the peace negotiations and to offer the
Russian army the three days' truce. Bagration replied that he was not
authorized either to accept or refuse a truce and sent his adjutant to
Kutuzov to report the offer he had received.

A truce was Kutuzov's sole chance of gaining time, giving Bagration's
exhausted troops some rest, and letting the transport and heavy convoys
(whose movements were concealed from the French) advance if but one
stage nearer Znaim. The offer of a truce gave the only, and a quite
unexpected, chance of saving the army. On receiving the news he
immediately dispatched Adjutant General Wintzingerode, who was in
attendance on him, to the enemy camp. Wintzingerode was not merely
to agree to the truce but also to offer terms of capitulation, and
meanwhile Kutuzov sent his adjutants back to hasten to the utmost the
movements of the baggage trains of the entire army along the Krems-Znaim
road. Bagration's exhausted and hungry detachment, which alone covered
this