American continents, we admitted the converse of
that proposition, and held that America should not meddle with European
controversies or conflicts. But we soon came to a realizing sense of the
ominous fact that Germany was the one nation of Europe which openly
despised and flouted the Monroe Doctrine as an outworn superstition. Her
learned professors (followed by a few servile American imitators) had
poured ridicule and scorn upon it in unreadable books. Her actions in
the West Indies and South America showed her contempt for it as a "bit
of American bluff." Gradually it dawned upon us that if France were
crushed and England crippled our dear old Monroe Doctrine would stand a
poor chance against a victorious and supercilious Imperial German
Government. As I wrote to Washington in August, 1914, their idea was to
"lunch in Paris, dine in London, and spend the night somewhere in
America."

Another real barrier to our taking any part in the war was our sincere,
profound, traditional love of peace. This does not mean, of course, that
America is a country of pacifists. Our history proves the contrary. Our
conscientious objections to certain shameful things, like injustice, and
dishonor, and tyranny, and systematic cruelty, are stronger than our
conscientious objection to fighting. But our national policy is averse
to war, and our national institutions are not favorable to its sudden
declaration or swift prosecution.

In effect, the United States is a pacific nation of fighting men.

What was it, then, that forced such a nation into a conflict of arms?

It was the growing sense that the very existence of this war was a crime
against humanity, that it need not and ought not to have been begun, and
that the only way to put a stop to it was to join the Allies, who had
tried to prevent its beginning, and who are still trying to bring it to
the only end that will be a finality.

It was also the conviction that the Monroe Doctrine, so far from being
an obstacle, was an incentive to our entrance. The real basis of that
doctrine is the right of free peoples, however small and weak, to
maintain by common consent their own forms of government. This Germany
and Austria denied. The issue at stake was no longer merely European. It
was worldwide.

The Monroe Doctrine could not be saved in one continent if its
foundation was destroyed in another. The only way to save it was to
broaden it.

The United States, having grown to be a Wo