rs the kind of validity, if any, which it
can possess. What existence has the known object for the knowing
subject? The result of this inquiry is generally intellectual scepticism
in a greater or less degree, namely, that the object has no existence
for the knower except a relative one, i.e. in so far as it is "known"
(see RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE). Finally the metaphysician, and in another
sphere the theologian, consider the nature of the pure or transcendental
self apart from its relations, i.e. the absolute self.

In ethics, egoistic doctrines disregard the ultimate problems of
selfhood, and assume the self to consist of a man's person and those
things in which he is or ought to be directly interested. The general
statement that such doctrines refer all moral action to criteria of the
individual's happiness, preservation, moral perfection, raises an
obvious difficulty. Egoism merely asserts that the self is all-important
in the application of moral principles, and does not in any way supply
the material of these principles. It is a purely formal direction, and
as such merely an adjunct to a substantive ethical criterion. A
practical theory of ethics seeks to establish a particular moral ideal;
if it is an absolute criterion, then the altruist would place first the
attainment of that ideal by others, while the egoist would seek it for
himself. The same is true of ethical theories which may be described as
material. Of the second type are those, e.g. of Hobbes and Spinoza,
which advocate self-preservation as the ideal, as contrasted with modern
evolutionist moralists who advocate race-preservation. Again, we may
contrast the early Greek hedonists, who bade each man seek the greatest
happiness (of whatever kind), with modern utilitarian and social
hedonists, who prefer the greatest good or the greatest happiness of the
greatest number. It is with hedonistic and other empirical theories that
egoism is generally associated. As a matter of fact, however, egoism has
been no less prominent in intuitional ethics. Thus the man who seeks
only or primarily his own moral perfection is an egoist par excellence.
Such are ascetics, hermits and the like, whose whole object is the
realization of their highest selves.

The distinction of egoistical and altruistic action is further
complicated by two facts. In the first place, many systems combine the
two. Thus Christian ethics may be said to insist equally on duty to self
and duty to o