rted even by rail for over thirty years a
larger command than a regiment. In the face of all
this every official both civil and military of
staff and line seemingly did his best to overcome
these adverse conditions and though of course
mistakes were made I should hesitate to attribute
to any individual other than the purest motives
of patriotism. The wonder is it was done at all.
The wonder is it was done so well. The point of
embarkation for the first army of invasion was
Port Tampa, Florida. There was some delay in the
embarkation due to various causes one of which was
the inexperience of officers in transporting
troops by water. Another cause of delay was
uncertainty as to whether or not the Spanish fleet
was really confined in the harbor of Santiago.

On the afternoon of June 14th, the fleet steamed
out under its naval escort and a grander and more
impressive sight the world has never seen.

Arriving in the vicinity of Santiago some time was
spent in deciding where to attempt a landing. Two
plans were proposed, one an attack from the west,
which was said would involve, with the assistance
of the navy, the capture of the outer defenses of
the harbor of Santiago. The other plan, the one
which was adopted, ignored the existence of Morro
Castle and the coast defenses and contemplated an
attack on the city from the rear. This decided, a
point of debarkation was selected at Daiquiri.
There were no good maps of Cuba and very little
was known of the coast or country.

At Daiquiri the navy prepared the way for landing
by bombarding the town and driving out the Spanish
troops who before leaving set fire to the
buildings of the town and the machine shops and
the mines located there. There were no docks at
Daiquiri except a small wooden affair, old and out
of repair. The vessels could not go nearer than
about 300 yards from the shore and then only in
calm weather.

Nothing was taken ashore with the troops except
what they carried on their backs, but the load was
so heavy that to fall overboard in deep water