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to, but in co-ordination with physics. Biology must rank side by side with physics as an "independent fundamental science," and that in the form of tectonic. And the second point is, that the teleological point of view must take its place beside the causal. Only by recognising both can biology become a complete science. In the "Analytische Theorie der organischen Entwicklung" (1894) Driesch picks up the thread where he dropped it in the book before, and spins it farther, "traversing" his previous theoretical and experimental results. In this work the author still strives to remain within the frame of the tectonic and machine-theory, but the edges are already showing signs of giving way. Life, he says, is a mechanism based upon a given structure (it is however a machine which is constantly modifying and developing itself). Ontogenesis(98) is a strictly causal nexus, but following "a natural law the workings of which are entirely enigmatical" (with Wigand). Causality fulfils itself through "liberations," that is to say, cause and effect are not quantitatively equivalent; and all effect is, notwithstanding its causal conditioning, something absolutely new and not to be calculated from the cause, so that there can be no question of mechanism in the strict sense. And the whole is directed by purpose.(99) The vital processes compel us to admit that it seems "as if intelligence determined quality and order." Driesch still tries to reconcile causes and purposes as different "modes of regarding things," but this device he afterwards abandons. We cannot penetrate to the nature of things either by the causal or by the teleological method. But they are--as Kant maintained--two modes of looking at things, both of which are postulates of our capacity for knowing. Each must stand by itself, and neither can have its sequence disturbed by the interpolation of pieces from the other. In the domain of the causal there can be no teleological explanation, and conversely; one might as well seek for an optical explanation of the synthesis of water; but both are true in their own place. The Madonna della Sedia, looked at microscopically, is a mass of blots, looked at macroscopically it is a picture. And it "is" both of these. Driesch's conclusions continue to advance, led steadily onwards by his experimental studies. In the "Maschinentheorie des Lebens,"(100) he attacks his own earlier theories with praiseworthy determination, and remorsele
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