w
their interests," he wrote, "they will not encourage the Americans to
be carriers. That the Barbary States are an advantage to the maritime
powers is obvious. If they were suppressed, the little states of
Italy, etc., would have much more of the carrying trade. The Armed
Neutrality would be as hurtful to the great maritime powers as the
Barbary States are useful."[79]
It may be a novel thought to many Americans, that at that time
American commerce in the Mediterranean depended largely for protection
upon Portuguese cruisers; its own country extending none. When peace
was unexpectedly made between Portugal and Algiers in 1793, through
the interposition of a British consular officer, a wail of dismay went
up to heaven from American shipmen. "The conduct of the British in
this business," wrote the American consul at Lisbon, "leaves no room
to doubt or mistake their object, which was evidently aimed at us, and
that they will leave nothing unattempted to effect our ruin." It
proved, indeed, that the British consul's action was not that of his
Government, but taken on his own initiative; but the incident not only
recalls the ideas of the time, long since forgotten, but in its
indications, both of British commercial security and American
exposure, illustrates the theory of the Navigation Act as to the
reciprocal influence of the naval and merchant services. There was
then nothing, in the economical conditions of the United States, to
forbid a navy stronger than the Portuguese; yet the consul, in his
pitiful appeal to the Portuguese Court, had to write: "My countrymen
have been led into their present embarrassment by confiding in the
friendship, power, and protection of her Most Faithful Majesty," ...
which "lulled our citizens into a fatal security."[80] Our lamentable
dependence upon others, for the respect we should have extorted
ourselves, is shown in the instructions issued to Jay, on his mission
to England in 1794. "It may be represented to the British Ministry,
how productive of perfect conciliation it might be to the people of
the United States, if Great Britain would use her influence with the
Dey of Algiers for the liberation of the American citizens in
captivity, and for a peace upon reasonable terms. It has been
communicated from abroad, to be the fixed policy of Great Britain to
check our trade in grain to the Mediterranean. This is too doubtful to
be assumed, but fit for inquiry."[81] The Dey had declared war
|