hed in terms of anger and of blame, and this, not in cypher
as was her wont, but plain and open.

Mr. Gladstone addressed to Her Majesty by return, in the most courteous
manner possible, what may be considered a vindication of his actions in
the matter and also that of his Cabinet:--

"To the Queen,--

"Mr. Gladstone has had the honour this day to receive your Majesty's
telegram, _en clair_, relating to the deplorable intelligence received
this day from Lord Wolseley, and stating that it is too fearful to
consider that the fall of Khartoum might have been prevented and many
precious lives saved by earlier action. Mr. Gladstone does not
presume to estimate the means of judgment possessed by your Majesty,
but so far as his information and recollection at the moment go, he is
not altogether able to follow the conclusion which your Majesty has
been pleased thus to announce. Mr. Gladstone is under the impression
that Lord Wolseley's force might have been sufficiently advanced to
save Khartoum, had not a large portion of it been detached by a
circuitous route along the river, upon the express application of
General Gordon, to occupy Berber on the way to the final destination.
He speaks, however, with submission on a point of this kind. There
is, indeed, in some quarters, a belief that the river route ought to
have been chosen at an earlier period, and had the navigation of the
Nile, in its upper region, been as well known as that of the Thames,
this might have been a just ground of reproach. But when, on the
first symptoms that the position of General Gordon in Khartoum was not
secure, your Majesty's advisers at once sought from the most competent
persons the best information they could obtain respecting the Nile
route, the balance of testimony and authority was decidedly against
it, and the idea of the Suakin and Berber route, with all its
formidable difficulties, was entertained in preference; nor was it
till a much later period that the weight of opinion and information
warranted the definite choice of the Nile route. Your Majesty's
Ministers were well aware that climate and distance were far more
formidable than the sword of the enemy, and they deemed it right,
while providing adequate military means, never to lose from view what
might have proved to be the destruction of the gallant army in the
Soudan. It is probable t