stimate of our main
force before Delhi at less than 2000 men. This, unhappily, is not
intrinsically improbable. The force was, by many persons, never
reckoned at more than 6000 or 7000 men; and this, when reduced by
three-and-twenty conflicts (perhaps more), in which the enemy had the
advantage of artillery more powerful than ours, and (what is worse) of
trained artillerymen more numerous, might too naturally come down to
the small number stated.

3. The doubtful condition of Lucknow, Benares, and Agra comes in the
rear of all this to strike a frost into the heart, or would do so,
again I say, if any other nation were concerned.

4. Worse still, because reluctantly unfolding facts that had
previously been known and kept back, is the state of Bombay. When
retreats on board the shipping are contemplated, or at least talked
of, the mere insulated case of Kolapore becomes insignificant.

5. I read a depressing record in the very quarter whence all our hopes
arise. In summing up the particular transports throughout July whose
destination was Calcutta, I find that the total of troops ordered to
that port in the thirty-one days of July was just 6500, and no more.
Every place was rapidly becoming of secondary importance in comparison
of the area stretching with a radius of 150 miles in every direction
from the centre of Allahabad. And the one capital danger is too
clearly this--that, being unable to throw in _overwhelming_ succours,
those inadequate succours, matched against the countless resources of
Hindoo vagrant ruffianism, may, at the utmost, enable us to keep a
lingering hold, whilst endless successions of incomparably gallant men
fall before our own rifles, our own guns, and that discipline of a
cowardly race which we ourselves have taught. We are true to
ourselves, and ever shall be so: that is a rock to build upon. Yet, if
it should appear by January next that no deep impression has then been
made upon revolting India, it will probably appear the best course to
send no more rivulets of aid; but to _combine_ measures energetically
with every colony or outpost of the empire; to call up even the
marines and such sections of our naval forces as have often
co-operated with the land forces (in the Chinese war especially); and
to do all this with a perfect disregard of money. Lord Palmerston
explained very sufficiently why it is that any powerful squadrons of
ships, which would else have rendered such overwhelming succour