fore, if the effect is evil, he is
answerable for that evil. This, however, supposes that he could foresee
the danger of such evil effect.

That evil effect is said to be _indirectly_ willed; for it follows from
a cause which is _directly_ willed. If, then, you should give a dose to
a pregnant mother which is intended to stop her fever or other ailment,
but may also bring on abortion, the stopping of her fever is directly
intended, and the abortion is said to be indirectly intended or willed.
Those are the received terms in moral science. It were more correct to
say that the abortion in this case is an effect not intended at all, but
only _permitted_. That, then, which is permitted to result from our
acts is said to be indirectly willed.

Are we then always responsible for evil effects permitted or indirectly
willed? The principle laid down seems to say so. But then that principle
admits of important exceptions. If we could never do an act from which
we know evil consequences may follow, then we could scarcely do anything
of importance; a young man could certainly not become a physician at
all, for he is almost certain to injure some of his patients in the
course of his professional life. But if we had no Doctors, such a loss
would be a much greater evil to mankind than their occasional mistakes.
Here then we seem to be in a dilemma, with evil on both sides of us. And
then we are reminded of that other principle of which we spoke before,
that we may never do evil at all that good may come of it. What shall we
do? The solution is this: we should never _do_ evil, but we are often
justified in _permitting_ evil to happen; in other words, we can never
will evil _directly_, but we can often will it _indirectly_: we can do
what is right in itself, even though we know or fear that evil will
also result from our good act.

This conduct requires four conditions: 1. That we do not wish the evil
itself, but make all reasonable effort to avoid it. 2. That the
immediate effect we wish to produce is good in itself. 3. That the good
effect intended is at least as important as the evil effect permitted.
4. That the evil is not made a means used to obtain the good effect.

Now let us apply these principles to the case in hand.

1. If the medicine is necessary to save the mother's life, and it is not
certain to bring on abortion, though it is likely to do so, then the
good effect is greater and more immediate or direct than the bad e