in association
with Admiral Dewey and Major-General Otis, were instructed "to
facilitate the most humane and effective extension of authority
throughout the islands, and to secure with the least possible delay the
benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the
inhabitants." These gentlemen were Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, president
of Cornell University; the Hon. Charles Denby, for many years minister
to China, and Prof. Dean C. Worcester, of the University of Michigan,
who had made a most careful study of life in the Philippines. While
the treaty of peace was under consideration in the Senate, these
Commissioners set out on their mission of good will and liberation.
Their character was a sufficient guaranty of the beneficent purpose with
which they went, even if they had not borne the positive instructions of
this Government, which made their errand pre-eminently one of peace and
friendship.

But before their arrival at Manila the sinister ambition of a few
leaders of the Filipinos had created a situation full of embarrassment
for us and most grievous in its consequences to themselves. The clear
and impartial preliminary report of the Commissioners, which I transmit
herewith, gives so lucid and comprehensive a history of the present
insurrectionary movement that the story need not be here repeated. It is
enough to say that the claim of the rebel leader that he was promised
independence by an officer of the United States in return for his
assistance has no foundation in fact and is categorically denied by
the very witnesses who were called to prove it. The most the insurgent
leader hoped for when he came back to Manila was the liberation of the
islands from the Spanish control, which they had been laboring for years
without success to throw off.

The prompt accomplishment of this work by the American Army and Navy
gave him other ideas and ambitions, and insidious suggestions from
various quarters perverted the purposes and intentions with which he had
taken up arms. No sooner had our army captured Manila than the Filipino
forces began to assume an attitude of suspicion and hostility which the
utmost efforts of our officers and troops were unable to disarm or
modify. Their kindness and forbearance were taken as a proof of
cowardice. The aggressions of the Filipinos continually increased until
finally, just before the time set by the Senate of the United States for
a vote upon the treaty, an attack