both on behalf of the
claimant and of the United States, and that at December term, 1877, the
Court of Claims rendered a decision adverse to the claimant, expressly
stating that the claimants had failed to establish their claim both in
law and on the facts. Not satisfied with this conclusion of the Court of
Claims, the claimants took an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, where the case was again argued and was decided, October term,
1878, the judgment of the Court of Claims being declared to be in
accordance with the law and therefore affirmed. In these two decisions
the law and the facts pertaining to the claim were fully set forth and
discussed.

The bill further confers upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction to try
and determine certain alleged claims of said Tice and others for money
collected on account of the Tice meters, but not paid over to him or
them under the regulations of the Treasury.

The amount of the latter claim, according to the report of the committee
of the House of Representatives to which this bill was referred, is
$140,000. It does not appear from the report of the committee, nor from
any documents to which I have access, who are the other persons by whom
this latter sum is claimed. The claim for $140,000 must have accrued
prior to July, 1871, and therefore at this time is of at least
twenty-seven years' standing.

It will thus be perceived that the object of the bill is to remove from
the pathway of the claimants two legal bars to the prosecution of their
claim in the courts--one, the bar of the statute of limitations, which
requires all claimants against the Government to present their claims
and bring actions thereon within six years from the time the cause of
action accrues; and the other, that bar of estoppel which arises by
reason of a former adverse judgment, rendered in a court of competent
jurisdiction. This is not a general modification of the law in these
respects, but a special application of it to these particular claimants.

If the principle on which the statute of limitations is founded is
wise and beneficent, then the effect of it ought not to be impaired by
special legislative exemptions in favor of particular persons or cases
except upon very clear and just grounds, where no lack of diligence in
the prosecution of the claim is apparent. I cannot find in the papers
submitted to me any sufficient grounds to justify a special exception
from the ordinary rule in fa