reply received by Mr Redmond's own supporters in Cork, who
submitted the Memorandum to him with an expression of their own
approval of its terms, was a mere formal acknowledgment.

I am confident that Mr Redmond's own judgment favoured this proposal,
as it did the policy of Conference and Conciliation in 1909, but that
he was overborne by the other bosses, who had him completely at their
mercy and who had not the wisdom to see that this gave them a glorious
and honourable way out of their manifold difficulties.

There were, meanwhile, differences at the headquarters of the National
Volunteers over Mr Redmond's offer of their services "for the defence
of the shores of Ireland," which was made without their knowledge or
consent. They, however, passed a resolution declaring "the complete
readiness of the Irish Volunteers to take joint action with the Ulster
Volunteer Force for the defence of Ireland." The Prime Minister
promised in Parliament that the Secretary for War would "do everything
in his power after consultation with gentlemen in Ireland, to arrange
for the full equipment and organisation of the Irish Volunteers." But
the War Office had other views in the matter, and though a scheme was
drawn up by General Sir Arthur Paget, Commanding the Forces in
Ireland, "by which the War Office may be supplied from the Irish
Volunteers with a force for the defence of Ireland," this scheme was
immediately rejected by the War Office authorities who, in their
efforts to gain Irish recruits--and I write with perfect knowledge of
the facts--were guilty of every imaginable blunder and every possible
insult to Irish sentiment and Irish ideals.

The Ulster Volunteers, on the other hand, were allowed to retain their
own officers and their own tests of admission, and were taken over,
holus-bolus, as they stood; were trained in camps of their own, had
their own banners, were kept compactly together and were recognised in
every way as a distinct unit of Army organisation. All of these
privileges were insolently refused to the Nationalists of the
South--they were for a time employed in the paltry duty of minding
bridges, but they were withdrawn from even this humiliating
performance after a short period.

Meanwhile an Irish Division was called for to be composed of Southern
Nationalists, and with the Government guarantee that "it would be
manned by Irishmen and officered by Irishmen." I had my own strong and
earnest conviction about t