asury list of the House of Commons. 311 decided friends and 189 enemies-
that is 500; the remainder, consisting of moderate Tories, violent Tories,
good and bad doubtfuls, as well as Huskissonians (the latter 13), are more
likely to be against us than for us.

Rosslyn still hankers after a coalition, but reform has made it impossible.
We might have had this time last year Sir J. Graham. We might even now have
Palmerston, [Footnote: It appears from Lord Palmerston's published papers
that this was an error. He had already determined to act with the Whigs,
and not to take office without Lord Grey and Lord Lansdowne. See Ashley's
_Life of Lord Palmerston_, vol. i. p. 211.] but the Duke seems determined
to go on as he is, Peel and all, even Bathurst, seem to have a correct view
of the danger; but I see no flinching.

_October 4._

Saw the Duke. Suggested that we must soon consider what should be done with
respect to the China trade. If we were to give up the monopoly we had
better do so at once, on the first day of the Session, with a good grace,
and not make ourselves appear to do it with reluctance. The Duke said we
must certainly consider it. Had I talked with the Chairs about it? I said
no. I had thought it best to wait till the Cabinet had come to a decision
as to what should be done. I had privately advised them to turn over in
their minds the plan of the Company going on with the Government slightly
varied, but without monopoly.

The Duke said he could not make up his mind without hearing first what the
Chairs had to say. I observed that if they, that is Astell, thought the
Government hesitated, they would certainly say they could not go on without
monopoly. However, the Duke seemed to think it was impossible for the
question to come before the Cabinet before we had talked with the Chairs.
So I have asked him and Loch to meet at the Treasury at twelve on Monday.

I should like to see Tucker and Stuart, but I must do it privately, as I
have no principle to go upon in consulting with individual Directors.

The Duke seems very reluctant to give up the monopoly, and to have very
exaggerated ideas of the value of the Company's intervention.

He showed me a letter he had received from Mole, in which he takes a very
moderate view of the Belgian question. Expresses the most earnest desire
for peace, as war would place everywhere the two extreme principles in
conflict. France will not interfere, neither can she suffer o