so far as it regards
religion.

"To justice, or that part of it which is commonly executive, answers the
education of the inns of court and chancery. Upon which to philosophize,
requires a public kind of learning that I have not. But they who take
upon them any profession proper to the educations mentioned--that is,
theology, physic, or law--are not at leisure for the essays.
Wherefore the essays, being degrees whereby the youth commence for all
magistracies, offices, and honors in the parish, hundred, tribe, Senate,
or prerogative; divines, physicians, and lawyers not taking these
degrees, exclude themselves from all such magistracies, offices, and
honors. And whereas lawyers are likest to exact further reason for
this, they (growing up from the most gainful art at the bar to those
magistracies upon the bench which are continually appropriated to
themselves, and not only endowed with the greatest revenues, but also
held for life) have the least reason of all the rest to pretend to
any other, especially in an equal commonwealth, where accumulation of
magistracy or to take a person engaged by his profit to the laws, as
they stand, into the power, which is legislative, and which should keep
them to what they were, or ought to he, were a solecism in prudence.
It is true that the legislative power may have need of advice and
assistance from the executive magistracy, or such as are learned in
the law; for which cause the judges are, as they have heretofore been,
assistants in the Senate. Nor, however it came about, can I see any
reason why a judge, being but an assistant or lawyer, should be member
of a legislative council.

"I deny not that the Roman patricians were all patrons, and that the
whole people were clients, some to one family and some to another,
by which means they had their causes pleaded and defended in some
appearance gratis; for the patron took no money, though if he had a
daughter to marry, his clients were to pay her portion, nor was this so
great a grievance. But if the client accused his patron, gave testimony
or suffrage against him, it was a crime of such a nature that any man
might lawfully kill him as a traitor; and this, as being the nerve of
the optimacy, was a great cause of ruin to that commonwealth; for
when the people would carry anything that pleased not the Senate, the
senators were ill provided if they could not intercede-that is, oppose
it by their clients; with whom, to vote otherwise th