f body
and soul. In the acquisition of riches, too, he will aim at order and
harmony; he will not desire to heap up wealth without measure, but he
will fear that the increase of wealth will disturb the constitution of
his own soul. For the same reason he will only accept such honours as
will make him a better man; any others he will decline. 'In that case,'
said he, 'he will never be a politician.' Yes, but he will, in his own
city; though probably not in his native country, unless by some divine
accident. 'You mean that he will be a citizen of the ideal city, which
has no place upon earth.' But in heaven, I replied, there is a pattern
of such a city, and he who wishes may order his life after that image.
Whether such a state is or ever will be matters not; he will act
according to that pattern and no other...
The most noticeable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:--(1) the
account of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the
king from the tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven.
1. Plato's account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in
this respect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which are
attributed to them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics, opposed
to all pleasure, but rather desires that the several parts of the
soul shall have their natural satisfaction; he even agrees with the
Epicureans in describing pleasure as something more than the absence of
pain. This is proved by the circumstance that there are pleasures which
have no antecedent pains (as he also remarks in the Philebus), such as
the pleasures of smell, and also the pleasures of hope and anticipation.
In the previous book he had made the distinction between necessary
and unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated by Aristotle, and he now
observes that there are a further class of 'wild beast' pleasures,
corresponding to Aristotle's (Greek). He dwells upon the relative and
unreal character of sensual pleasures and the illusion which arises out
of the contrast of pleasure and pain, pointing out the superiority of
the pleasures of reason, which are at rest, over the fleeting pleasures
of sense and emotion. The pre-eminence of royal pleasure is shown by
the fact that reason is able to form a judgment of the lower pleasures,
while the two lower parts of the soul are incapable of judging the
pleasures of reason. Thus, in his treatment of pleasure, as in many
other subjects, the philosophy of Plato is
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