s that people
should try and take art more simply than they do; that, if not called
upon to try and persuade others to simpler courses, they should not
theorise themselves. By theorising, I mean, incorrectly perhaps, all
manner of irrelevant fantasticating, whether it take the shape of
seeking in art for hidden psychological meanings or moral values, or of
using art merely as a suggestion of images and emotions, the perception
of which infallibly interferes with, and sometimes entirely replaces,
the perception of the art itself. To you, I know, all that I have
written seems extremely narrow, seems to limit excessively the powers of
art, the enjoyments we can derive therefrom. But I think otherwise; I
understand fully that, in the first place, there is included, under the
general name of art, the result of ever so many intellectual activities:
activities of mere psychological perception, of mere mechanical
imitation and handling, which, though belonging quite equally to other
concerns, such as science or handicraft, are yet pleasurable both to him
who exerts and to him who perceives them; I understand that there are
so many different sorts of pictures, statues, and poems, and so many
different kinds of minds to see and read them; I see that so many
questions of mental and physical why and how are connected with every
sort of visible or audible thing, that there is nothing, however utterly
bad and idiotic and abortive, among the productions of mankind (and,
consequently, among the things called works of art), out of which some
sort of intellect may not derive very keen enjoyment. The enjoyment,
however, may be merely similar to that with which a physiologist studies
a disease, or a psychologist a form of vice; and, to my mind, this sort
of enjoyment, which does not depend upon any perception of beauty, is no
more artistic than would be that of such men of science. And my wish is
merely that such pleasure be not substituted where there is an object
to afford, or a mind to receive, the mere simple, honest pleasure in
beauty. Moreover, with regard to your imputation of narrowness, I
think, on the contrary, that, could we break ourselves of our habit of
replacing or alloying real artistic interests with irrelevant matters,
we should (and this is to my mind a great reason for so doing) be
ridding ourselves of a great number of imaginary restrictions to our
enjoyment. For in many, nay, most artistic things there is, in greater
o
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