e said is that, left to ourselves, we shall not be able to
break through the lines of investment, and that when we have eaten up
all our food, we shall have to capitulate.

_December 7th._

When this war commenced the Parisians believed in the bulletins which
their own Government issued, because they thought it only natural that
their arms should be successful, and they disbelieved in any foreign
newspaper which ventured to contest their victories. At present they are
incredulous alike of everything that comes from friend and foe.
Nine-tenths of them are under the impression that Count Moltke, in
announcing the defeat of the Army of the Loire, is guilty of a
deliberate falsehood; the other tenth supposes that he has grossly
exaggerated a slight mishap, and that the occupation of Orleans only
proves that Orleans was not defended by a large body of troops. It takes
about three days for any information which is not in accordance with the
wishes of this extraordinary population to obtain credit, no matter what
amount of evidence there may be to prove its truth. If really the Army
of the Loire has been put _hors de combat_, sooner or later the fact
will be admitted; then, although we shall still pin our faith to Keratry
or Bourbaki, the disaster will no doubt tend to produce a certain
degree of discouragement, more particularly as it is coupled with the
retreat of Ducrot's forces from the south bank of the Marne. French
politicians will insist upon dressing up their facts in order to meet
the requirements of the moment, and they never seem to consider that so
soon as the real state of things comes out there must be an inevitable
reaction, which will be far more depressing than if the truth had been
fairly told at once. I hear that when Count Moltke's letter arrived, two
of the members of the Government of National Defence were inclined to
accept his offer to verify what had occurred on the Loire, but that
General Trochu stated that he intended to resist until the last, and
that consequently, whether Orleans had fallen, or not, was a matter of
no importance. If Trochu really thinks that a further resistance and a
further sacrifice of life will materially advance the interests of his
country, of course he is right to hold out; but if, disregarding facts,
he simply wishes to oblige the Prussians to continue the siege, for no
purpose except to prove his own tenacity, he cannot be regarded either
as a good patriot or a sensibl