ssing; and this lay in mere observation and
admeasurement of the astuteness of his opponents. For example, an arrant
simpleton is his opponent, and, holding up his closed hand, asks, 'Are
they even or odd?' Our schoolboy replies, 'Odd,' and loses; but upon the
second trial he wins, for he then says to himself: 'The simpleton had
them even upon the first trial, and his amount of cunning is just
sufficient to make him have them odd upon the second; I will therefore
guess odd;' he guesses odd and wins. Now, with a simpleton a degree
above the first, he would have reasoned thus: 'This fellow finds that in
the first instance I guessed odd, and in the second he will propose to
himself, upon the first impulse, a simple variation from even to odd, as
did the first simpleton; but then a second thought will suggest that
this is too simple a variation, and finally he will decide upon putting
it even as before. I will therefore guess even;'--he guesses even and
wins. Now this mode of reasoning in the schoolboy, whom his fellows
termed 'lucky,'--what, in its last analysis, is it?"

"It is merely," I said, "an identification of the reasoner's intellect
with that of his opponent."

"It is," said Dupin; "and upon inquiring of the boy by what means he
effected the thorough identification in which his success consisted, I
received answer as follows: 'When I wish to find out how wise, or how
stupid, or how good, or how wicked is anyone, or what are his thoughts
at the moment, I fashion the expression of my face, as accurately as
possible, in accordance with the expression of his and then wait to see
what thoughts or sentiments arise in my mind or heart, as if to match
or correspond with the expression.' This response of the schoolboy lies
at the bottom of all the spurious profundity which has been attributed
to Rochefoucauld, to La Bruyere, to Machiavelli, and to Campanella."

"And the identification," I said, "of the reasoner's intellect with that
of his opponent depends, if I understand you aright, upon the accuracy
with which the opponent's intellect is admeasured."

"For its practical value it depends upon this," replied Dupin; "and the
Prefect and his cohort fail so frequently, first, by default of this
identification, and, secondly, by ill-admeasurement, or rather through
non-admeasurement, of the intellect with which they are engaged. They
consider only their own ideas of ingenuity; and, in searching for
anything hidden, advert