uestion
of moral as well as technical efficiency and to this the democracy pays
no heed, because it is convinced that no special efficiency is necessary
and that common sense is all that is required. Common sense, however, is
like wit; it is useful in every walk of life, but is not sufficient in
any one of them. This is just what democracy cannot or will not
understand.

It makes just as great a mistake in its civil and criminal jurisdiction,
though it has, up to now, so far departed from its principles as to
appoint qualified jurists to civil judgeships. No one denies that this
body of men is efficient. Those who act as judges know their law. There
is, however, as I have often had occasion to point out, a moral as well
as a technical efficiency, and in limiting the independence that is
essential to moral efficiency, democracy neutralises the technical
efficiency of its servants. Let me explain my meaning further.

Formerly the magistracy was a recognised and autonomous branch of the
public service, and as a result, save as it was affected by revolution
and in normal times by the fear of revolution, enjoyed an absolute
independence. This gave, or rather preserved intact, its moral
efficiency. For moral efficiency consists in an ability to act
according to the dictates of conscience, and is equivalent to a sort of
moral independence.

Now, the magistrates form a department of the administration and are a
body of officials. The State appoints, promotes or refuses to promote
and pays them. In short the State has them at its mercy, just as
military officers are controlled by the War Office, or tax-collectors by
the Treasury. Hence they are deprived of their independence and moral
efficiency, for they are always tempted to give judgment as the
Government would wish.

There is, it is true, a guarantee for their independence in the
permanence of their appointments, but this only applies to those who
have reached the summit of their profession, or are on the point of
retiring, or have no further interest in promotion. The young magistrate
who wants to get on, a perfectly legitimate ambition, is by no means
independent, for if he does not give satisfaction, he may enjoy a
peculiar kind of permanence, the permanence of standing still at the
starting point. The only independent judges, to whom justice is the sole
interest, are either those who have served for forty years or the
President of the _Cour de Cassation_. I may add