a certain tutelage to their own monarchs'
immediate Ministries, they have continually, slowly, consciously,
expanded their freedom from such tutelage, substituting for it
self-government or rule by their own representatives, without forsaking
but rather enhancing their allegiance to the common Crown. This has long
been the symbol of their self-government, even as it is to old country
kinsmen the symbol of rule by themselves.
The alteration manifested by Canada's active, voluntary engagement in
the European war is the change from Canadians holding, as they formerly
did, that Great Britain was bound to defend Canada, while Canadians were
not bound to defend Great Britain outside Canada. The "dependency" has
not been now dragged in; it acted as an independency; it recognized its
participation with Great Britain in a common danger; it proceeded quite
voluntarily, quite independently, to recruit, organize, dispatch, and
maintain large forces for the common cause. Canada's course has become
that of a partner in respect of acceptance of risks and of contribution
to expenses.
This partner has no formally specified share in gains, or in authority,
or in future policy of the concern. Canada has no obvious, distinct,
admitted way or voice as to the conduct of war or making of peace. She
appears, with the other self-governing Dominions of the Crown, as an
ally having no vote in settlements, none of the prerogatives of an ally.
Hence some observers in Great Britain, in Canada, in other realms of the
Crown contend that the old, expressed relations between Great Britain,
Canada, and the other Dominions must inevitably be extensively changed
formally as well as actually in consequence of the war.
Some say imperial federation cannot but ensue. Others argue that formal
independence must arrive if such federation come not speedily. Others
contend for an Empire League of sister States. Nobody ventures to
mention what was often talked publicly by Canadians from thirty to fifty
years ago, and later by Goldwin Smith, viz., Canada's entrance to the
United States as a new tier of sovereign States. The idea of severance
from Great Britain has vanished. Discussion of the other alternatives is
not inactive, but it is forced. It engages the quidnuncs. They are
talkers who must say something for the delight of hearing themselves;
or they are writers who live under the exigency of needing to get
"something different" daily into print. They are m
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