t_, and the enactment of more
just laws, after the present government is overturned. Nothing can
justify a revolution, a conflict, a waste of treasure and blood,
which are not going _to gain anything_ in the end.--Again, the last
four years' experience of European nations may read us a lesson.

6. To justify rebellion, or what is the same thing, violent
resistance to the execution of the laws, it is necessary that
something more than a _small fraction_ of the people should rise in
such a resistance. If the people in general are ready for it, and
are willing to run all the hazards of a rebellious conflict with the
government, conscious that they have righteousness and the God of
righteousness on their side; this is a very different affair from
what it would be, if only a minority of the people were ready for
rebellion. Such a minority have no right, on account of their deemed
injuries, to plunge the nation into a civil war, for the purpose of
over-turning a government which suits the great mass of the
people;--a civil war, in which there is every prospect, that the
government and the majority who aim to support it will prevail; and
prevailing, must crush their hostile opponents, this hasty and
reckless minority.

These are some of the things which appear necessary, in order to
justify violent resistance of Law. They must _all_ exist, or such
resistance would be criminal,--contrary to reason, to benevolence,
and to Christ.

It is not a thing to be expected at all among mankind, that all laws
should be right, or "just and equal." Human legislation must be
expected to bear the marks of an imperfection, which attaches itself
to everything human. If obedience to government were obligatory,
only on the condition that all the laws of that government are just;
then, such obedience would mean nothing at all, and every man would
be absolved from all allegiance to the government, and from all
obligations to obey. Such is man, so limited his wisdom and so
imperfect his holiness, that human laws must necessarily be
imperfect, and must, therefore, necessarily operate hardly in some
instances, upon more or less of the people. It is impossible, that
the thing should be otherwise--in the very nature of the case, it is
impossible. And if every individual were allowed to be the judge in
his own case, whether or not the law operated so hardly upon him
that he might disobey; _then_ his _obligation_ to obedience would
mean just nothing a