t propriety give occasion
to an inquiry, and, perhaps, by that inquiry some facts may be
ascertained which may afford sufficient reasons for farther procedure.

But such, my lords, is the form of the bill now before us, that if it
should pass into a statute, it would, in my opinion, put a stop to all
future inquiry, by making those incapable of giving evidence, who have
had most opportunities of knowing those transactions, which have given
the chief occasion of suspicion, and from whom, therefore, the most
important information must naturally be expected.

The first requisite qualification of a witness, whether we consult
natural equity and reason, or the common law of our own country, is
disinterestedness; an indifference, with regard to all outward
circumstances, about the event of the trial at which his testimony is
required. For he that is called as a witness where he is interested, is
in reality giving evidence in his own cause.

But this qualification, my lords, the bill now before us manifestly
takes away; for every man who shall appear against the person into whose
conduct the commons are inquiring, evidently promotes, in the highest
degree, his own interest by his evidence, as he may preclude all
examination of his own behaviour, and secure the possession of that
wealth which he has accumulated by fraud and oppression, or, perhaps,
preserve that life which the justice of the nation might take away.

Nothing, my lords, is more obvious, than that this offer of indemnity
may produce perjury and false accusation; nothing is more probable, than
that he who is conscious of any atrocious villanies, which he cannot
certainly secure from discovery, will snatch this opportunity of
committing one crime more, to set himself free from the dread of
punishment, and blot out his own guilt for ever, by charging lord ORFORD
as one of his accomplices.

It may be urged, my lords, that he who shall give false evidence,
forfeits the indemnity to which the honest witness is entitled; but let
us consider why this should be now, rather than in any former time,
accounted a sufficient security against falsehood and perjury. It is at
all times criminal, and at all times punishable, to commit perjury; and
yet it has been hitherto thought necessary, not only to deter it by
subsequent penalties, but to take away all previous temptations; no
man's oath will be admitted in his own cause, though offered at the
hazard of the punishment infl