FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153   154  
155   156   157   158   159   160   161   162   163   164   165   166   167   168   169   170   171   172   173   174   175   176   177   178   179   >>   >|  
placed in the crown, consists in the power of _rejecting_, rathar [Transcriber's Note: rather] than _resolving_; this being sufficient to answer the end proposed. For we may apply to the royal negative, in this instance, what Cicero observes of the negative of the Roman tribunes, that the crown has not any power of _doing_ wrong, but merely of _preventing_ wrong from being done[p]. The crown cannot begin of itself any alterations in the present established law; but it may approve or disapprove of the alterations suggested and consented to by the two houses. The legislative therefore cannot abridge the executive power of any rights which it now has by law, without it's own consent; since the law must perpetually stand as it now does, unless all the powers will agree to alter it. And herein indeed consists the true excellence of the English government, that all the parts of it form a mutual check upon each other. In the legislature, the people are a check upon the nobility, and the nobility a check upon the people; by the mutual privilege of rejecting what the other has resolved: while the king is a check upon both, which preserves the executive power from encroachments. And this very executive power is again checked, and kept within due bounds by the two houses, through the privilege they have of enquiring into, impeaching, and punishing the conduct (not indeed of the king, which would destroy his constitutional independence; but, which is more beneficial to the public) of his evil and pernicious counsellors. Thus every branch of our civil polity supports and is supported, regulates and is regulated, by the rest; for the two houses naturally drawing in two directions of opposite interest, and the prerogative in another still different from them both, they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper limits; while the whole is prevented from separation, and artificially connected together by the mixed nature of the crown, which is a part of the legislative, and the sole executive magistrate. Like three distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of government in a direction different from what either, acting by themselves, would have done; but at the same time in a direction partaking of each, and formed out of all; a direction which constitutes the true line of the liberty and happiness of the community. [Footnote p: _Sulla--tribunis plebis sua lege injuriae faciendae potestatem ademit, auxilii
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153   154  
155   156   157   158   159   160   161   162   163   164   165   166   167   168   169   170   171   172   173   174   175   176   177   178   179   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

executive

 
direction
 

houses

 

alterations

 

consists

 

rejecting

 
nobility
 

privilege

 

people

 

mutual


powers

 

negative

 

government

 
legislative
 
mutually
 

prerogative

 

directions

 

branch

 

counsellors

 

public


pernicious
 

polity

 
supports
 

naturally

 
drawing
 
opposite
 

supported

 

regulates

 

regulated

 
interest

magistrate
 
constitutes
 
liberty
 
happiness
 

formed

 

partaking

 

community

 

Footnote

 

faciendae

 
potestatem

ademit

 

auxilii

 

injuriae

 
tribunis
 

plebis

 

acting

 

artificially

 
connected
 

separation

 

prevented