ng, Action, and so on.
But they are beginning to talk differently now. They are coming to see
that a human being cannot be cut up like that. The Reason is the whole
man thinking, judging, comparing. Feeling accompanies Reason and is
never found apart from it, for reason implies consciousness, and
without consciousness nothing that can properly be called Feeling
exists. The will is simply the whole man acting.

Now I will frankly confess that in strict logic I can find no place for
the freedom of the will. I will defy anyone to do so if he knows much
about the laws of thought. But, as the late Mr. Lecky said in his "Map
of Life," and Mr. Mallock has since pointed out in "The Reconstruction
of Belief," we are compelled to overleap logic when considering this
matter. No argument will convince us that we have not some power of
individual self-direction and self-control. The most thoroughgoing
determinist that ever lived forgets his determinism even while he
argues about it. It must be amusing even to himself to see how he
enjoys scoring off his opponent, thus taking for granted in the heat of
controversy the very freedom he sets out to deny. The assumption at
the bottom of every vigorous argument is that the other party might
have held other views, and ought to have held other views than those
assailed. The position of the determinist in effect is this: You must
believe you have no freedom to choose anything, otherwise you are to
blame for choosing wrongly. Of course the consistent determinist would
evade this _reductio ad absurdum_ by saying that he is as much
necessitated in blaming his opponent for holding wrong views as the
opponent is for refusing to give them up. He might also tell me that I
am arguing for free will in an obscurantist fashion by admitting at the
outset that in strict logic I can find no place for it. But I am not
arguing for free will at all. I am simply showing that by the very
constitution of our minds we cannot avoid taking some measure of free
will for granted. Even the determinist who scouts this view and calls
it absurd is by his own action a convincing demonstration of its truth.

+Only the Infinite has perfect freedom.+--But this contention is
something more than mere logic chopping. It points to a truth too high
for a finite mind to grasp, namely, that whatever our moral freedom may
be, it must consist with the all-directing universal will. There is no
such thing as perfect