radiction to the order of nature, he sets himself to examine the
grounds of our belief in that order. With a vigour of logic rarely
equalled, and with a confidence in its conclusions never surpassed, he
disposes of this belief in a manner calculated to startle those who,
without due examination, had come to the conclusion that the order of
nature was secure. What we mean, he says, by our belief in the order
of nature, is the belief that the future will be like the past. There
is not, according to Mr. Mozley, the slightest rational basis for this
belief.

That any cause in nature is more permanent than its existing and known
effects, extending further, and about to produce other and more
instances besides what it has produced already, we have no evidence.
Let us imagine,' he continues, 'the occurrence of a particular
physical phenomenon for the first time. Upon that single occurrence
we should have but the very faintest expectation of another. If it
did occur again, once or twice, so far from counting on another
occurrence, a cessation would occur as the most natural event to us.
But let it continue one hundred times, and we should find no
hesitation in inviting persons from a distance to see it; and if it
occurred every day for years, its occurrence would be a certainty to
us, its cessation a marvel... What ground of reason can we assign for
an expectation that any part of the course of nature will be the next
moment what it has been up to this moment, i.e. for our belief in the
uniformity of nature? None. No demonstrative reason can be given,
for the contrary to the recurrence of a fact of nature is no
contradiction. No probable reason can be given; for all probable
reasoning respecting the course of nature is founded _upon_ this
presumption of likeness, and therefore cannot be the foundation of it.
No reason can be given for this belief. It is without a reason. It
rests upon no rational grounds, and can be traced to no rational
principle.'

*****

'Everything,' Mr. Mozley, however, adds, 'depends upon this belief,
every provision we make for the future, every safeguard and caution we
employ against it, all calculation, all adjustment of means to ends,
supposes this belief; and yet this belief has no more producible
reason for it than a speculation of fancy. It is necessary,
all-important for the purposes of life, but solely practical, and
possesses no intellectual character.

'... The proper function,'