e situation. In 1854 Douglas had
defeated Davis and Pierce in their far-reaching plans for the
development of the Southwest; Chase and his allies had defeated Douglas
in his counter-scheme for the growth of the Northwest in 1854-55; and
now Douglas broke the solidarity of the Democratic party and gave hope
and courage to the North, where the idea of secession was fast winning
the minds of leading men. If Douglas joined the Republicans, the
overthrow of the South was assured; if he became an independent
candidate for the Presidency, the Republicans were made certain of an
easy victory. It was this that prompted Greeley to indorse Douglas in
1857, and caused Seward to say a good word for his rival and opponent.

Buchanan read Douglas out of the party. Jefferson Davis denounced him as
worse than a demagogue. Judges of the Supreme Court expressed their
contempt for "the ambitious perpetual candidate." No settlement of the
Kansas question was possible under these circumstances. Douglas returned
to Illinois in the summer of 1858 to open his campaign for reelection to
the Senate. He had never been so popular before. Chicagoans who had
denounced and spurned him as a traitor to his country in 1854 now gave
him the greatest ovation that city had ever given to any one. Big
business men, railroad builders, and laboring men hastened to give him
assurance of their favor. Even partisan opponents went over to the "new"
Douglas. In fact, the people saw that his popular sovereignty idea had
been misunderstood. It was already working out Northwestern or
Free-State control of the Territories, and the fear of losing the
Territories had been the motive for following Chase and Sumner in 1854.

But the Republicans of the Northwest had been planning to make an end of
the "Little Giant," the man who was the most feared of all the public
leaders of the time. Abraham Lincoln was to be his successor in the
Senate. Norman B. Judd, Joseph Medill, and John Wentworth were the
astute advisers of the new party in their section. Seward, Weed, and
even John J. Crittenden, the popular successor of Henry Clay in the
United States Senate, advised the Illinois Republicans not to oppose
Douglas, since Douglas was already doing the Democrats more mischief
than any new Republican Senator could hope to do. The Eastern leaders
were concerned about the campaign of 1860, and naturally they cultivated
the differences of their opponents.

Lincoln was also making plan