ealised.

Sir Charles Dilke once related a conversation he had with Bismarck
concerning Paul Kruger. "Cavour was much smarter, more clever, more
diplomatically gifted than I," said the Prince, "but there is a much
stronger, much abler man than Cavour or I, and that man is President
Kruger. He has no gigantic army behind him, no great empire to support
him. He stands alone with a small peasant people, and is a match for us by
mere force of genius. I spoke to him--he drove me into a corner." Kruger's
great ability, as delineated by Bismarck, was indisputable, and a man with
less of it might have been President and might have avoided the war, but
only at a loss to national interests. The President had one aim and one
goal, his country's independence, and all the force of his genius was
directed toward the attainment of that end. He tried to secure his
country's total independence by peaceable means, but he had planted the
seed of that desire so deeply in the minds of his countrymen that when it
sprouted they overwhelmed him and he was driven into war against his will.
Kruger would not have displaced diplomacy with the sword, but his burghers
felt that peaceful methods of securing their independence were of no
avail, and he was powerless to resist their wishes. He did not lead the
Boers into war; they insisted that only war would give to them the relief
they desired, and he followed under their leadership. When the meetings of
the Volksraad immediately preceding the war were held, it was not Paul
Kruger who called for war; it was the representatives of the burghers, who
had been instructed by their constituents to act in such a manner. When
the President saw that his people had determined to have war, he was
leader enough to make plans which might bring the conflict to a successful
conclusion, and he chose a moment for making a declaration that he
considered opportune. The ultimatum was decided upon eleven days before it
was actually despatched, but it was delayed eight days on account of the
Free State's unpreparedness. Kruger realised the importance of striking
the first blow at an enemy which was not prepared to resist it, and the
Free State's tardiness at such a grave crisis was decidedly unpleasant to
him. Then, when the Free State was ready to mobilise, the President
secured another delay of three days in order that diplomacy might have one
more chance. His genius had not enabled him to realise the dream of his
life wi