hinery for the election of the president, and the
safeguard provided by the constitution for the choice of the best man
is a mere nullity. One thing is quite certain, that party government
under the direction of a responsible ministry, responsible to
parliament and the people for every act of administration and
legislation, can have far less dangerous tendencies than a party
system which elects an executive not amenable to public opinion for
four years, divides the responsibilities of government among several
authorities, prevents harmony among party leaders, does not give the
executive that control over legislation necessary to efficient
administration of public affairs, and in short offers a direct premium
to conflict among all the authorities of the state--a conflict, not so
much avoided by the checks and balances of the constitution as by the
patience, common sense, prudence, and respect for law which presidents
and their cabinets have as a rule shown at national crises. But we can
clearly see that, while the executive has lost in influence, congress
has gained steadily to an extent never contemplated by the founders of
the constitution, and there are thoughtful men who say that the true
interests of the country have not always been promoted by the change.
Party government in Canada ensures unity of policy, since the premier
of the cabinet becomes the controlling part of the political machinery
of the state; no such thing as unity of policy is possible under a
system which gives the president neither the dignity of a
governor-general, nor the strength of a premier, and splits up
political power among any number of would-be party leaders, who adopt
or defeat measures by private intrigues, make irresponsible
recommendations, and form political combinations for purely selfish
ends.[39]

It seems quite clear then that the system of responsible ministers
makes the people more immediately responsible for the efficient
administration of public affairs than is possible in the United
States. The fact of having the president and the members of congress
elected for different terms, and of dividing the responsibilities of
government among these authorities does not allow the people to
exercise that direct influence which is ensured, as the experience of
Canada and of England proves, by making one body of men immediately
responsible to the electors for the conduct of public affairs at
frequently recurring periods, arranged by w