had not yet
opened their thunders upon Sebastopol." On the 17th of October,
twenty-one days after the occupation of Balaklava, the allied forces
commenced fire by land and sea on the stronghold of the enemy. The
bombardment continued from half-past six, A.M., until nightfall, but is
conceded to have been a complete and mortifying failure. From this time
until the 5th of November, it will not be contended that any substantial
advantage was gained by the invading forces, or that material progress
was made towards the reduction of the Russian Gibraltar.

Then came the Battle of Inkerman, a gallant and desperate sortie of the
Russians, bravely and successfully resisted by the besiegers. The loss
of life on both sides was terrible. To what extent was _this_ battle
decisive? Mr. Russell shall give his own testimony on this point:--"We
had nothing to rejoice over, and almost everything to deplore, in the
Battle of Inkerman. We defeated the enemy, indeed, but had not advanced
one step nearer the citadel of Sebastopol." In other words, the Allies
had repulsed the Russians, but had barely escaped annihilation, while,
from having been the besiegers, they became the besieged, and remained
so until largely reinforced from home. "A heavy responsibility," says
Mr. Russell, "rests on those whose neglect enabled the enemy to attack
us where we were least prepared for it, and whose indifference led them
to despise precautions which, taken in time, might have saved us many
valuable lives, and have trebled the loss of the enemy." The English
not only committed the serious error of underrating the enemy, and
neglecting the most ordinary precautions against surprise, but, during
the whole of the desperate and bloody fight, they gave no proof whatever
of generalship. The stubborn, unyielding bravery of the troops was
the salvation of the army. "We owed the victory, such as it was, to
strength, not to superior intelligence and foresight. It was a soldiers'
battle, in which we were saved by the muscle, nerve, and courage of our
men." Humanity shudders and the heart sickens over the sufferings
of that gallant army of martyrs to cabinet incapacity and military
imbecility during the long and dreary winter of 1854-55.

On the 9th of April, 1855, commenced the second grand bombardment of
Sebastopol, which, though continuing for twelve days, resulted, like the
first, in mortifying failure, no serious or irreparable injuries being
caused to the main