a verdict of GUILTY. They presented
rather a haggard appearance, having been locked up for twenty-four
hours, and some of them being perhaps a little troubled in their
consciences. The jury, it was understood, had been divided, from the
beginning, four for acquittal and eight for conviction. These four were
all Irishmen, and perhaps they did not consider it consistent with their
personal safety and business interests to persist in disappointing the
slave-holding public of that verdict which the District Attorney had so
imperiously demanded. The agreement, it was understood, had taken place
only a few moments before they came in, and had been reached entirely on
the strength of Williams' testimony to my having said, that had I got
off I should have made an independent fortune. Now, it was a curious
coincidence, that at the very moment that this agreement was thus taking
place, Williams, again on the stand as a witness on the second trial,
wished to take back what he had then sworn to on the first trial,
stating that he could not tell whether he had heard me say this, or
whether he had heard of my having said it from somebody else.

After the rendition of the verdict of the other jury, the second case
was again resumed. The evidence varied in only a few particulars from
that which had been given in the first case. There was, in addition,
the testimony of Upperman, the pretended owner of the woman and her
daughters, one of fifteen, the other nine years old, whom I was charged
in this indictment with stealing. This man swore with no less alacrity,
and with no less falsehood, than Houver had done before him. He stated
that about half-past ten, of that same night that the Pearl left
Washington, while he was fastening up his house, he saw a man standing
on the side-walk opposite his door, and observed him for some time. Not
long after, having gone to bed, he heard a noise of somebody coming down
stairs; and, calling out, he was answered by his slave-woman, who was
just then going off, though he had no suspicion of it at the time. That
man standing on the side-walk he pretended to recognize as me. He was
perfectly certain of it, beyond all doubt and question. The object of
this testimony was, to lead to a conclusion of enticement or persuasion
on my part, and so to bring the case within one of the judge's
instructions already stated. On a subsequent trial, Upperman was still
more certain, if possible, that I was the man. But he