tfully fanned by the Conspirators, in heated
discussions over the Tariff Acts of 1824, and 1828, and 1832, until, by
the latter date, the people of the Cotton-States were almost frantic,
and ready to fight over their imaginary grievances. Then it was that
the Conspirators thought the time had come, for which they had so long
and so earnestly prayed and worked, when the cotton Sampson should wind
his strong arms around the pillars of the Constitution and pull down the
great Temple of our Union--that they might rear upon its site another
and a stronger edifice, dedicated not to Freedom, but to Free-Trade and
to other false gods.

South Carolina was to lead off, and the other Cotton States would
follow. South Carolina did lead off--but the other Cotton-States did
not follow.

It has been shown in these pages how South Carolina declared the Tariff
Acts aforesaid, null and void, armed herself to resist force, and
declared that any attempt of the general Government to enforce those
Acts would cause her to withdraw from the Union. But Jackson as we know
throttled the treason with so firm a grip that Nullification and
Secession and Disunion were at once paralyzed.

The concessions to the domineering South, in Clay's Compromise Tariff of
1833, let the Conspirators down easily, so to speak; and they pretended
to be satisfied. But they were satisfied only as are the thirsty sands
of Africa with the passing shower.

The Conspirators had, however, after all, made substantial gains. They
had established a precedent for an attempt to secede. That was
something. They had demonstrated that a single Southern State could
stand up, armed and threatening, strutting, blustering, and bullying,
and at least make faces at the general Government without suffering any
very dreadful consequences. That was still more.

They had also ascertained that, by adopting such a course, a single
Southern State could force concessions from the fears of the rest of the
United States. That was worth knowing, because the time might come,
when it might be desirable not only for one but for all the Southern
States to secede upon some other pretext, and when it would be awkward,
and would interfere with the Disunion programme, to have the other
States either offer or make concessions.

They had also learned the valuable lesson that the single issue of
Free-Trade was not sufficiently strong of itself to unite all the
Southern States in a determinatio