he was exiled, for some time, to an estate of his in
Touraine, and Bonaparte even deliberated about transporting him to
Cayenne, when Talleyrand observed "that such a condemnation would
endanger that colony of France, as he would certainly organize there a
focus of revolutions, which might also involve Surinam and the Brazils,
the colonies of our allies, in one common ruin. In the present
circumstances," added the Minister, "if Sieyes is to be transported, I
wish we could land him in England, Scotland, or Ireland, or even in
Russia."

I have just heard from a general officer the following anecdote, which he
read to me from a letter of another general, dated Ulm, the 25th instant,
and, if true, it explains in part Bonaparte's apparent indiscretion in
the threat thrown out against all ancient dynasties.

Among his confidential generals (and hitherto the most irreproachable of
all our military commanders), Marmont is particularly distinguished.
Before Napoleon left this capital to head his armies in Germany, he is
stated to have sent despatches to all those traitors dispersed in
different countries whom he has selected to commence the new dynasties,
under the protection of the Bonaparte Dynasty. They were, no doubt,
advised of this being the crisis when they had to begin their
machinations against thrones. A courier from Talleyrand at Strasburg to
Bonaparte at Ulm was ordered to pass by the corps under the command of
Marmont, to whom, in case the Emperor had advanced too far into Germany,
he was to deliver his papers. This courier was surprised and interrupted
by some Austrian light troops; and, as it was only some few hours after
being informed of this capture that Bonaparte expressed himself frankly,
as related above, it was supposed by his army that the Austrian
Government had already in its power despatches which made our schemes of
improvement at Paris no longer any secrets at Vienna. The writer of this
letter added that General Marmont was highly distressed on account of
this accident, which might retard the prospect of restoring to Europe its
long lost peace and tranquillity.

This officer made his first campaign under Pichegru in 1794, and was, in
1796, appointed by Bonaparte one of his aides-de-camp. His education had
been entirely military, and in the practice the war afforded him he soon
evinced how well he remembered the lessons of theory. In the year 1796,
at the battle of Saint-Georges, before Mantua, he ch