that systems of this
character can be used for the attainment of other ends than those of
mere recognition and classification. They, of course, can be used as
instruments of intercourse, of culture, and of commerce. But they may
further be utilised in education in the training of the pupil to
self-apply a system of knowledge to the solution of relatively new
problems, and it is for this reason mainly that the ancient languages
possess their value as educational instruments.

Lastly, systems of knowledge may be formed in which the inter-relation
of part to part within the system is that of identity of cause and
effect. In the establishment of scientific knowledge the aim is to show
the causal inter-relation of part to part within a systematic whole or
unity. Hence also, as in the case of language systems, systems of this
nature are capable of being used to train the pupil to self-apply
knowledge in the solution of practical and theoretical problems, and in
the realising of the practical ends of life. Once again it must be noted
that in the establishment of the various systems of knowledge the one
activity ever present is that of reason seeking ever to connect part to
part in order that some end or interest may be attained. Moreover, we
may misuse the power of reason, and employ it in the attainment of ends
which are valueless in the sense that they further no real interest or
end in life. This is done whenever knowledge is crammed, whenever the
bond of connection between one part of knowledge and the other is
extrinsic, and whenever facts are connected and remembered by bonds of a
more or less accidental or factitious nature. And since such knowledge
can further no direct interest or end in life, its acquisition must, as
a rule, be motived by some strong indirect interest. As a consequence,
whenever the indirect interest, whatever its nature may be,--the fear of
punishment, or the passing of an examination,--ceases to operate, then
the desire for further acquisition also ceases. Hence it follows that
the establishment of any such system is of comparatively little value.
It may pave the way at a later period for the formation of a system of
intrinsically connected knowledge, but as a general rule such systems,
because they cannot be used, tend soon to drop out of mind, and to be of
no further consequence in the determination of conduct. But further,
this misuse of reason, this inciting of the mind to memorise facts
unrel