e of many substances--_ergo_, it necessarily
follows that only one substance of the same nature can exist."

It will be necessary for the reader to remember that Spinoza commenced
his philosophical studies at the same point with Descartes. Both
recognized existence as the primal fact, self-evident and indisputable.

But while Descartes had, in some manner, fashioned a quality--God and
God-created substance--Spinoza only found one, substance, the definition
of which included existence. By his fourth proposition ("of things which
have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other, ") he
destroyed the creation theory, because by that theory God is assumed to
be a spirit having nothing in common with matter, yet acting on
matter; and Lewes speaks of the fourth proposition in the following
terms:--"This fallacy has been one of the most influential corrupters
of philosophical speculation. For many years it was undisputed, and most
metaphysicians still adhere to it. The assertion is that only like can
act upon like; but although it is true that _like_ produces (causes)
_like_, it is also true that like produces _unlike_; thus fire produces
pain when applied to our bodies; _explosion_ when applied to gunpowder;
_charcoal_ when applied to wood; all these effects are unlike the
cause." We cannot help thinking that in this instance, the usually
thoughtful Lewes has either confused substance with its modes, or, for
the sake of producing a temporary effect, has descended to mere sophism.
Spinoza's proposition is, that _substances_ having nothing in common,
cannot act on one another. Lewes deals with several modes of the same
substance as though they were different substances. Way, more, to
make his argument the more plausible, he entirely ignores in it that
_noumenon_ of which he speaks as underlying all phenomena, and uses each
phenomenon as a separate existence. In each of the instances mentioned,
however varied may be the modification, the essence is the same. They
are merely examples of one portion of the whole acting upon another
portion, and there is that in each mode which is common to the whole,
and by means of which the action takes place.

Much has been said of Spinoza's "God" and "Divine Substance," and we
must refer the reader to Definition Six, in which God is defined as
being "infinite substance." Now, although we should be content to strike
the word "God" out of our own tablet of philosophical nomenclature,