as told to go back to our line and
report his position. This the Bosche would not do as there were too many
bullets flying about. Later the Germans were seen advancing and Lt. Parr
tried to get the German to move into another shell hole in the hope that
he himself might not be discovered. This also the German refused,
preferring the comparative safety of a hole to the risk of the open.
Finally the advancing enemy reached the shell hole and would have
bayoneted Lt. Parr had not his prisoner protected him. The friend turned
out to be a corporal, carried Lt. Parr's pack back for him and saw him
into hospital and in possession of an unlooted pack--an example of the
vicissitudes of war. While going through the casualty clearing station
he got a glimpse of the brutality of the Hun; not that he saw our men
being treated worse than their own, but all were handled in a manner
unknown in our corresponding casualty clearing stations.
On 27th August at 4 a.m. we received a warning order that the Brigade
would attack and to be ready to move at 8 a.m. The general orders were
to pierce the Hindenburg Line, capture Fontaine Crosilles and continue
the advance in a south-easterly direction and take Riencourt. 6th and
7th H.L.I. were to be the assaulting battalions, ourselves in Brigade
reserve, two of our companies having the special task of mopping up
Fontaine Crosilles. We were to move about a mile in rear of the
assaulting battalions. The advance commenced covered by a powerful
barrage, and when on the rising ground other barrages covering other
advances could be clearly seen. Against this overwhelming artillery fire
the enemy did not stand in numbers, but his machine-guns, light and
heavy, were bravely manned and caused many casualties. As the advance
progressed great numbers of these guns were passed, as a rule with at
least one dead German beside each gun. A belt of country had to be
passed through on which a hostile heavy artillery barrage had been put
down. It was extraordinary how few casualties were incurred in going
through it. The formation of "blobs" adopted proved most suitable and
elastic, if difficult to direct. The left of the assaulting battalions
was to have touched Fontaine Crosilles but swung away to the right. This
left an unprotected flank to them, as the nearest troops on that flank
were the Canadians near Cherisy. Our leading companies ("B" and "C")
keeping on our original line of advance came under heavy fire as
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