n them, and for their sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in
preaching the Gospel." Yet the possession of much wealth increases
the weight of care, which is a great distraction to man's mind and
hinders him from giving himself wholly to God's service. The other
two, however, namely the love of riches and taking pride or glorying
in riches, result only from an abundance of wealth.

Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether
abundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the
care that one takes of one's own wealth, pertains to love of self,
whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care
that is given to things held in common pertains to the love of
charity which "seeketh not her own," but looks to the common good.
And since religion is directed to the perfection of charity, and
charity is perfected in "the love of God extending to contempt of
self" [*Augustine, De Civ. Dei xiv, 28,] it is contrary to religious
perfection to possess anything in private. But the care that is given
to common goods may pertain to charity, although it may prove an
obstacle to some higher act of charity, such as divine contemplation
or the instructing of one's neighbor. Hence it is evident that to
have excessive riches in common, whether in movable or in immovable
property, is an obstacle to perfection, though not absolutely
incompatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious
perfection to have enough external things, whether movables or
immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we consider poverty in
relation to the common end of religious orders, which is to devote
oneself to the service of God. But if we consider poverty in relation
to the special end of any religious order, then this end being
presupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that
religious order; and each religious order will be the more perfect in
respect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty more adapted
to its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the outward and
bodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance of outward
things, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "many things are needed for
action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But
the contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his
act: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle t