ed, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 4).
Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to
justice.

Obj. 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven,
viz. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection,
humanity," several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the
virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.

Obj. 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz.
"obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard
to inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and
"truthfulness" towards all; and of these "truthfulness" alone is
mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated
insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.

Obj. 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons
nine parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness, revenge,
commonsense, [*_eugnomosyne_] piety, gratitude, holiness, just
exchange" and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it is evident that
Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have
made an incomplete enumeration.

Obj. 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions _epieikeia_ as
being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any
of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to
justice are insufficiently enumerated.

_I answer that,_ Two points must be observed about the virtues
annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have
something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that
in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue.
Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above
(Q. 58, A. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person
may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the
essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his
due according to equality, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 11). Wherefore
in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the
perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of
equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For
certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are
unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man
renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered
to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I
render to the Lord for all the thin