ficing the foetus whenever the interests of the mother demand such a
sacrifice. General medical opinion is not, however, prepared at present to
go further, and is distinctly disinclined to aid the parents in exerting
an unqualified control over the foetus in the womb, nor is it yet disposed
to practice abortion on eugenic grounds. It is obvious, indeed, that
medicine cannot in this matter take the initiative, for it is the primary
duty of medicine to save life. Society itself must assume the
responsibility of protecting the race.

Dr. S. Macvie ("Mother _versus_ Child," _Transactions Edinburgh
Obstetrical Society_, vol. xxiv, 1899) elaborately discusses the
respective values of the foetus and the adult on the basis of
life-expectancy, and concludes that the foetus is merely
"a parasite performing no function whatever," and that "unless
the life-expectancy of the child covers the years in which its
potentiality is converted into actuality, the relative values of
the maternal and foetal life will be that of actual as against
potential." This statement seems fairly sound. Ballantyne
(_Manual of Antenatal Pathology: The Foetus_, p. 459)
endeavors to make the statement more precise by saying that "the
mother's life has a value, because she is what she is, while the
foetus only has a possible value, on account of what it may
become."

Durlacher, among others, has discussed, in careful and cautious
detail, the various conditions in which the physician should, or
should not, induce abortion in the interests of the mother ("Der
Kuenstliche Abort," _Wiener Klinik_, Aug. and Sept., 1906); so
also, Eugen Wilhelm ("Die Abtreibung und das Recht des Arztes zur
Vernichtung der Leibesfrucht," _Sexual-Probleme_, May and June,
1909). Wilhelm further discusses whether it is desirable to alter
the laws in order to give the physician greater freedom in
deciding on abortion. He concludes that this is not necessary,
and might even act injuriously, by unduly hampering medical
freedom. Any change in the law should merely be, he considers, in
the direction of asserting that the destruction of the foetus is
not abortion in the legal sense, provided it is indicated by the
rules of medical science. With reference to the timidity of some
medical men in inducing abortion, Wilhelm remarks that, even in
the present state of the law,