s to
supplement the rations which did not always reach their lines at
regular intervals. The Gyppy boys were excellent leaders, and to them
and the donkeys the front-line fighting men in the hill country owe
much. They were saved a good deal of exhausting labour in manhandling
stores from the point where camels had to stop, and they could
therefore concentrate their attention on the Turk.
By December 2 the fine exertions of the troops on the line of
communications had enabled the XXth Corps Commander to make his plans
for the capture of Jerusalem, and at a conference at Enab on the
following day General Chetwode outlined his scheme, which, put in
a nutshell, was to attack with the 60th and 74th Divisions in an
easterly direction on the front Ain Karim-Beit Surik and, skirting the
western suburbs of Jerusalem, to place these two divisions astride the
Jerusalem-Nablus road, while the 53rd Division advanced from Hebron to
threaten the enemy from the south and protect the right of the 60th
Division. I will not apologise for dealing as fully as possible with
the fighting about Jerusalem, because Jerusalem was one of the great
victories of the war, and the care taken to observe the sanctity of
the place will for all time stand out as one of the brightest examples
of the honour of British arms. But before entering upon those details
I will put in chronological sequence the course of the fighting on
this front from the moment when the XXth Corps took over the
command, and show how, despite enemy vigilance and many attacks, the
preparations for the outstanding event of the campaign were carried
through. It is remarkable that in the short period of ten days
the plans could be worked out in detail and carried through to a
triumphant issue, notwithstanding the bad weather and the almost
overwhelming difficulties of supply. Only the whole-hearted
co-operation of all ranks made it possible. On the day after the
XXth Corps became responsible for this front General Chetwode had a
conference with Generals Barrow, Hill, and Girdwood, and after a full
discussion of the situation in the hills decided to abandon the plan
of getting on to the Jerusalem-Nablus road from the north in favour
of attempting to take Jerusalem from the west and south-west. The
commanders of the Yeomanry Mounted Division and the 52nd Division were
asked to suggest, from their experience of the fighting of the past
ten days, what improvement in the line was necessa
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