being, at least. Again
there came reports from Petrograd of activity along the front in
Dobrudja, but this appears to have been at the most nothing but a
demonstration to distract Mackensen from effecting any crossing
farther up the Danube at a point where he might flank the Rumanian
lines along the Alt. Throughout the countries of the Allies it was now
generally recognized that Rumania was doomed, unless the Russians
could send enough forces to rescue her.

On the 26th official dispatches from both Berlin and Bucharest stated
that Mackensen had crossed the Danube at Zimnitza and was advancing
toward Bucharest. The German statement had him in the outskirts of
Alexandria, only forty-seven miles from the capital, and reported that
the Rumanians were retreating eastward from the lower Alt. On the
following day Berlin announced that the entire length of the Alt had
been abandoned by the Rumanians, which was confirmed by a dispatch
from Bucharest. This retreat had been forced by the crossing effected
by Mackensen's troops to the rear of the line, threatening its flank
and rear. That the danger to Bucharest was now being felt was obvious
from the fact that on the following day the Rumanian Government and
diplomatic authorities removed from Bucharest to Jassy, about two
hundred miles northeastward, near the Russian frontier. On this date,
too, it was reported that Mackensen had captured Giurgiu, which showed
that he had advanced thirty miles during the past twenty-four hours.
From Giurgiu there is direct rail connection with Bucharest: this line
Mackensen could use for transport service, thus increasing the danger
to the Rumanian main army that it might have its retreat cut off.
Having abandoned the Alt line, the next logical line that the
retreating Rumanians should have attempted to hold was the Vedea,
another river running parallel to the Alt and emptying into the
Danube. Here, too, there was a railroad running along the river bank,
or close to it, which would have served as a supply line. But it was
just this railroad which Mackensen had captured at Giurgiu. Once more
he threatened the Rumanian flank, and so a stand at the Vedea became
also impossible. Certainly the Teutons were now moving with
extraordinary rapidity, and there was undoubtedly some truth in the
Berlin statement that the Rumanians were fleeing eastward in a
panic-stricken mass. Great quantities of war material were abandoned
and captured by the advancing