have blundered into the war at any time during
the past two years, but to have entered, as it is now doing, at the
right time and in the clear interest of a purely international
programme required the exercise of an intellectualised and imaginative
leadership. And in supplying the country with this leadership Mr.
Wilson was interpreting the ideas of thoughtful Americans who wished
their country to be fighting on the side of international right, but
not until the righteousness of the Allied cause was unequivocally
established. It has taken some time to reach this assurance. The war
originated in conflicting national ambitions among European Powers for
privileged economic and political positions in Africa and Asia, and if
it had continued to be a war of this kind there never could have been a
question of American intervention. Germany, however, had been dreaming
of a more glorious goal than Bagdad and a mightier heritage than that
of Turkey. She betrayed her dream by attacking France through Belgium
and by threatening the foundations of European order. The crucifying
of Belgium established a strong presumption against Germany, but the
case was not complete. There still remained the dubious origin of the
war. There still remained a doubt whether the defeat of German
militarism might not mean a dangerous triumph of Russian autocracy.
Above all there remained a more serious doubt whether the United States
in aiding the Allies to beat Germany might not be contributing merely
to the establishment of a new and equally unstable and demoralising
Balance of Power in Europe. It was well, consequently, to wait and see
whether the development of the war would not do away with some of the
ambiguities and misgivings, while at the same time to avoid doing
anything to embarrass the Allies. The waiting policy has served.
Germany was driven by the logic of her original aggression to threaten
the security of all neutrals connected with the rest of the world by
maritime communications. The Russian autocracy was overthrown, because
it betrayed its furtive kinship with the German autocracy. Finally,
President Wilson used the waiting period for the education of American
public opinion. His campaign speeches prophesied the abandonment of
American isolation in the interest of a League of Peace. His note of
last December to the belligerents brought out the sinister secrecy of
German peace terms and the comparative frankness of that of