ousand, Artaxerxes Mnemon, in B.C. 375, sent a huge
armament against Egypt, consisting of 220,000 men, 500 ships of war, and
a countless number of other vessels carrying stores and provisions.
Pharnabazus commanded the Persian soldiery, Iphicrates the mercenaries.
Having rendezvoused at Acre in the spring of the year, they set out
early in the summer, and proceeded in a leisurely manner through
Philistia and the desert, the fleet accompanying them along the coast.
This route brought them to Pelusium, which they found so strongly
fortified that they despaired of being able to force the defences and
felt it necessary to make a complete change in their plan of attack.
Putting to sea with a portion of the fleet, and with troops to the
number of three thousand, and sailing northward till they could no
longer be seen from the shore, they then, probably at nightfall, changed
their course, and steering south-west, made for the Mendesian mouth of
the Nile, which was only guarded by the twin forts with their connecting
bridge. Here they landed without opposition, and proceeded to
reconnoitre the forts. The garrison gave them battle outside the walls,
but was defeated with great loss; and the forts themselves were taken.
The remainder of the force conveyed by the ships, was then landed
without difficulty; and the invaders, having the complete mastery of one
of the Nile mouths, had it in their power to direct their attack to any
point that might seem to them at once most important and most
vulnerable.

Under these circumstances the Athenian general, Iphicrates, strongly
recommended a dash at Memphis. The main strength of the Egyptian army
had been concentrated at Pelusium. Strong detachments held the other
mouths of the Nile. Memphis, he felt sure, must be denuded of troops,
and could probably be carried by a _coup de main_; but the advice of the
rapid Greek was little to the taste of the slow-moving and cautious
Persian. Pharnabazus declined to sanction any rash enterprise--he would
proceed according to the rules of art. He had the advantage of
numbers--why was he to throw it away? No, a thousand times no. He would
wait till his army was once more collected together, and would then
march on Memphis, without exposing himself or his troops to any danger.
The city would be sure to fall, and the object of the expedition would
be accomplished. In vain did Iphicrates offer to run the whole risk
himself--to take no troops with him beside