already pointed out, differ enormously. The suggested economic boycott
imposes a similar obligation on all members of the League; all alike can
immediately forbid all intercourse by their subjects with the aggressor,
instead of imposing on certain members the duty of going to war.
Secondly, it does not imply the maintenance of great armaments by any
State.

It is constantly found that a penalty of smaller amount, a less severe
punishment, is more likely to prevent a wrong than a heavier one,
provided that it is prompt and certain. Had Germany known a few months
sooner that Britain would assuredly go to war and put into such war her
whole resources if Belgium were invaded, it is not improbable that that
outrage would never have been committed; but had Germany also known that
the moment her troops crossed the Belgian frontier every German ship in
the United States would be interned, every American citizen punished as
a criminal by the United States Government if he traded with Germany,
that "intercourse" with the aggressor would be at once forbidden, and
that these restraints would be continued until complete restitution had
been made, is it not morally certain that Belgium would not have been
invaded? War might have been prevented. In fear of such an injury to
German trade and commerce, the bankers of Berlin and Frankfort would
have denounced war; the merchants of Hamburg and Bremen would have been
the strongest advocates of peace. A like test might be applied to other
cases of aggression. The effects of breaking off diplomatic--and, still
more, commercial--relationships, although no shot is fired and no
regiment mobilised, and of mere neutrality differ _toto coelo_. The very
people who are least influenced by moral restraints, who scorn justice,
will be most influenced by the financial losses and the destruction of
their trade.

It was, no doubt, right "to commend a study of the question" to His
Majesty's Government, but it is also well to commend to the Government
the desirability of consultation with those outside the Government
departments who have given study to it already. Like other problems, it
should be considered in advance during the War. As Lord Shaw forcibly
pointed out, "The project does not mean the slackening of our efforts or
a weakening of our forces or timidity in our policy in the present War.
If it did I would not be associated with it for one hour."

To quote Lord Grey's words, Germany has to be c