discouraged at
the thoroughness with which the Prussians stripped the country
after the last harvest, and that in some sections the people are
actually dying of hunger. Even in Warsaw, the death-rate in some
neighbourhoods has increased from 700 to 800 per cent. I was
witness to German rage when Viscount Grey stipulated that food
could be sent there only if the natives were allowed to have the
produce of their own land. Prussia wanted that produce, and she
got it.

I mention these supplies here because the Poles who worked to
produce them must be included in German labour estimates just as
much as though they had been working in Germany.

Germany also adds to her man-power by utilising her wounded so far
as possible. Her efforts in this direction are praiseworthy, since
they not only contribute to the welfare of the State, but benefit
the individual. I have seen soldiers with one leg gone, or parts
of both legs gone, doing a full day's work mending uniforms. The
blind are taught typewriting, which enables them to earn an
independent living in Government employ. In short, work is found
for everybody who can do anything at all.

In a previous chapter I have spoken of the organisation of the
children, a factor which should not be left out of consideration.

* * * * *
Having considered the assets, let us turn to the debits.

The German casualty lists to the end of 1916 total 4,010,160, of
which 909,665 have been killed or died of wounds. My
investigations in Germany lead me to put the German killed or died
of wounds at 1,200,000, and the total casualties at close to
5,000,000. If we assume that 50 per cent. of all wounded return to
the front and another 25 per cent. to service in the interior, we
must also consider in computation of man-power that the casualty
lists do not include the vast numbers of invalided, and the sick,
which almost balance those that return to the front. This means,
in short, that the net losses are nearly as great at any one time
as the gross losses. Consequently, according to my estimates there
must be at least 4,500,000 Germans out of action at this moment.

In a war of attrition it is the number of men definitely out of
action which counts, for the German lines can be successfully
broken, and only successfully broken, when there are not enough men
to hold them. The Germans now have in the West probably about 130
divisions.

Hindenburg's levies in t