y
was over, and then began the homeward march. It was not until eleven
o'clock on the 4th of September that the worn-out and famished cavalry
reached their camp near Omdurman.

Such was the pursuit as conducted by the regular troops. Abdel-Azim,
with 750 Arabs, persisted still further in the chase. Lightly equipped,
and acquainted with the country, they reached Shegeig, nearly a hundred
miles south of Khartoum, on the 7th. Here they obtained definite
information. The Khalifa had two days' start, plenty of food and water,
and many camels. He had organised a bodyguard of 500 Jehadia, and was,
besides, surrounded by a large force of Arabs of various tribes. With
this numerous and powerful following he was travelling day and night
towards El Obeid, which town was held by an unbeaten Dervish garrison
of nearly 3,000 men. On hearing these things the friendly Arabs
determined--not unwisely--to abandon the pursuit, and came boastfully
back to Omdurman.

In the battle and capture of Omdurman the losses of the Expeditionary
Force included the following British officers killed: Capt. G.
Caldecott, 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment; Lieut. R.G. Grenfell, 12th
Royal Lancers, attached 21st Lancers; Hon. H. Howard, correspondent of
the TIMES. In total, the British Division and Egyptian Army suffered 482
men killed or wounded.

The Dervish losses were, from computations made on the field and
corrected at a later date, ascertained to be 9,700 killed, and wounded
variously estimated at from 10,000 to 16,000. There were, besides, 5,000
prisoners.

CHAPTER XVII: 'THE FASHODA INCIDENT'

The long succession of events, of which I have attempted to give some
account, has not hitherto affected to any great extent other countries
than those which are drained by the Nile. But this chapter demands a
wider view, since it must describe an incident which might easily have
convulsed Europe, and from which far-reaching consequences have arisen.
It is unlikely that the world will ever learn the details of the subtle
scheme of which the Marchand Mission was a famous part. We may say with
certainty that the French Government did not intend a small expedition,
at great peril to itself, to seize and hold an obscure swamp on the
Upper Nile. But it is not possible to define the other arrangements.
What part the Abyssinians were expected to play, what services had been
rendered them and what inducements they were offered, what attitude
was to be